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This article examines in detail the legislative requirements for unlawful stalking in 
Queensland and in doing so, highlights possible ambiguities as to whether the victim 
is required to know that the alleged perpetrator is engaged in certain activities. 
Unlawful Stalking – s 359 
The relevant anti-stalking provisions in Queensland are found in Chapter 33 Unlawful 
Stalking, ss 359A-359F of the Code. The actual offence of stalking is created 
pursuant to s 359E which provides for an aggravated form of the offence in certain 
circumstances. The current definition and relevant acts that might constitute stalking 
are listed in s 359B of theCode: 
359B What is unlawful stalking 
Unlawful stalking is conduct— 
(a) intentionally directed at a person (the stalked person); 
and 
(b) engaged in on any 1 occasion if the conduct is protracted 
or on more than 1 occasion; and 
(c) consisting of 1 or more acts of the following, or a 
similar, type— 
(i) following, loitering near, watching or approaching 
a person; 
(ii) contacting a person in any way, including, for 
example, by telephone, mail, fax, email or through 
the use of any technology; 
(iii) loitering near, watching, approaching or entering a 
place where a person lives, works or visits; 
(iv) leaving offensive material where it will be found 
by, given to or brought to the attention of, a person; 
(v) giving offensive material to a person, directly or 
indirectly; 
(vi) an intimidating, harassing or threatening act 
against a person, whether or not involving violence 
or a threat of violence; 
(vii) an act of violence, or a threat of violence, against, 
or against property of, anyone, including the 
defendant; and 
(d) that— 
(i) would cause the stalked person apprehension or 
fear, reasonably arising in all the circumstances, of 
violence to, or against property of, the stalked 
person or another person; or 
(ii) causes detriment, reasonably arising in all the 
circumstances, to the stalked person or another 
person. 
  
Accordingly, stalking is unlawful when it involves conduct that is intentionally directed 
at a person on any one or more occasions.[1] The provision makes it clear that 
stalking can occur on one occasion providing the alleged stalking is over a 
‘protracted’ length of time.[2] The section then details a non-exhaustive list of acts 
which might constitute stalking and these include – following, loitering, watching, 
approaching, contacting, leaving offensive material where it will be found by the 
person, harassing whether or not involving violence.[3] The requirements pursuant to 
ss 359B(a)-(c) are then read in conjunction with s 359B(d)(i)-(ii) that stipulate the 
conduct would cause the stalked person to apprehend or fear or causesdetriment. 
The legislation contains a further provision under s 359C that details what is 
immaterial for unlawful stalking: 
Section 359C 
(1) For section 359B(a), it is immaterial whether the person doing 
the unlawful stalking— 
(a) intends that the stalked person be aware the conduct is 
directed at the stalked person; or 
(b) has a mistaken belief about the identity of the person at 
whom the conduct is intentionally directed. 
(2) For section 359B(a) and (c), it is immaterial whether the 
conduct directed at the stalked person consists of conduct 
carried out in relation to another person or property of another 
person. 
(3) For section 359B(b), it is immaterial whether the conduct 
throughout the occasion on which the conduct is protracted, or 
the conduct on each of a number of occasions, consists of the 
same or different acts. 
(4) For section 359B(d), it is immaterial whether the person doing 
the unlawful stalking intended to cause the apprehension or 
fear, or the detriment, mentioned in the section. 
(5) For section 359B(d)(i), it is immaterial whether the 
apprehension or fear, or the violence, mentioned in the section 
is actually caused. 
 
As shown in several Queensland cases, there appears to be some confusion as to 
the exact meaning of s 359B(d)(i), specifically in relation to the word, ‘would’ thus 
indicating that there may be a requirement that the ‘stalked person’ must have some 
knowledge of the alleged stalking, as will now be discussed. 
 
 
Ambiguity of Unlawful Stalking – s 359B(d)(i) knowledge on the part of the 
Victim 
The ambiguity with unlawful stalking in Queensland occurs because there is no 
explicit reference in the legislation that requires the victim to be aware they are in 
fact being stalked. The section merely states that the act be sufficient so that it 
‘would’ cause the stalked person apprehension or fear, reasonably arising. In 
situations where there does not appear to be evidence of the accused actually 
causing detriment to the stalked person pursuant to s 359B(d)(ii), the effect of s 
359B(d)(i) works to include the potential or likelihood of apprehension or fear of 
violence reasonably arising, as opposed to requiring the 
person actually experiencing the fear or the apprehension of it. In other words 
because the legislation refers specifically to the ‘stalked person’, there would appear 
to be a requirement to assess that person and not any person; thus requiring the 
imposition of a subjective test on the part of the victim as well as an objective 
assessment based on ‘reasonableness’.[4] It is the wording of this provision that 
would appear to be unsettled and subject to further judicial scrutiny. 
Two cases that illustrate this ambiguity are R v Davies [2004] 279 and the more 
recent case of Re Taylor (2009) 195 A Crim R 53. 
In the case of Davies, a pre-trial ruling held at the Beenleigh District Court in 2004 
ruled that s 359B(d)(i) is not made out unless the ‘stalked person is aware what’s 
going on and is reacting to that awareness …’[5]  One of the questions before the 
Court was whether it was necessary for the person stalked to be aware of the 
stalking activity? The accused was charged with two counts of unlawful stalking 
against his two step daughters. The accused installed a hidden camera in the ceiling 
cavity of the family bathroom. From time to time when either of the complainants 
were undressing or showering in that room, the accused would activate the camera 
and watch the complainants on a monitor in another room, or would record them on 
video tape.[6]  The alleged acts were carried out between 31 May 2001 and 22 
January 2003.[7] 
The two complainants only became aware of the actions of their step father when 
their brother alerted authorities upon discovering the existence of the video camera. 
Once informed of their step father’s actions, the girls’ reactions were not consistent 
with the apprehension of any fear of violence to themselves or of property,[8] or the 
suffering of actual detriment[9] as required. Rather, the actions were that of anger 
and annoyance and in particular a concern that the video evidence might be 
circulated to others.[10] During the course of proceedings, McGill DCJ discussed the 
meaning and operation of s 359B(a)-(c) and referred to the explanatory notes to the 
amended section from 1999 in order to derive meaning of s 359B(d)(i). Ultimately, 
McGill DCJ concluded that, 
It is not stalking unless the person concerned, the stalked person, is aware of what is 
going on and is reacting to that awareness so as to satisfy paragraph (d) … It seems 
to me that it is not stalking to engage in conduct, the stalked person is entirely 
unaware of merely because once the stalked person finds out about it later the 
stalked person is unhappy about it.[11] 
 
His Honour reached the conclusion that the acts perpetrated by the accused were 
insufficient to have breached s 359B(d)(i) on the basis that the said acts did not 
cause the victim apprehension of fear of violence. The mere fact that there was an 
element of ‘indecency’ about the behaviour, did not necessarily constitute a breach 
of the anti-stalking provisions. Emphasis here was given to the requirement of 
causing actual detriment or the potential to cause apprehension of fear of 
violence.  His Honour therefore reached the conclusion that the acts, despite being 
‘indecent’ in nature, did not breach either of the two provisions in s 359B(d). 
His Honour indicated that in order for the section to be made out completely it is a 
requirement for the victim to become aware of the actions at some stage since only 
then can it be ascertained whether the acts would cause apprehension of fear of 
violence.  Despite this, His Honour stipulated that the knowledge on the part of the 
victim did not need to coincide exactly with the timing of the acts in question. 
In some circumstances there might be some lapse of time [between] the act and the 
stalked person becoming aware of it. … But it seems to me that even in relation to 
that, unless the stalked person is made aware of it at some time, then it is difficult to 
see how either of the detriments could be suffered.[12] 
 
Thus, while it appears there is a temporal requirement that the victim have 
knowledge of the alleged behaviour, it is not necessary that the knowledge be 
contemporaneous with the alleged behaviour. Unfortunately, his Honour offered no 
further clarification on this point as to when the victims would need to have 
knowledge of the relevant acts.  His Honour also did not provide any clarification as 
to the appropriate test to determine how the accused’s actions ‘would’ cause the 
stalked person apprehension or fear of violence. 
A similar situation arose a number of years later in the case of Re Taylor (2009) 195 
A Crim R 53 where the question once again related to whether the victim needed to 
be aware of the actions of the stalker in order for the offence to be made out. 
In Taylor, the accused was charged with, among others things, one count of stalking 
his estranged wife and daughter while in possession of an automatic 
shotgun.[13] Prior to the day in question, the accused went to great lengths to seek 
the location of his wife and daughter.  Upon learning of their whereabouts, he 
obtained a number of items including a knife and a map and drove interstate to the 
area where he suspected her to be. Upon locating his wife, he laid in wait to avoid 
detection from them and others, but was ultimately apprehended by police after a tip-
off by a shop assistant. 
 
In this case, the victims had no knowledge of the accused’s actions until they were 
informed by the police.  Applegarth J considered the ruling in Davies but unlike the 
outcome of that case, concluded that there was sufficient evidence to deduce that 
the acts of the accused ‘would’ cause the wife apprehension or fear, reasonably 
arising, of violence against her.[14]His Honour made it clear that Davies was not like 
the present case. 
 
This is not a case, …in which the complainants were simply angry and 
upset.  The conduct would also cause the stalked person apprehension or 
fear, reasonably arising in all the circumstances, of violence to her, or another 
person.[15] 
 
Applegarth J accepted the argument that the complainants were not aware of the 
accused until after the arrest.  Importantly, it was only after the arrest of the accused 
that the ‘unlawful stalking was in fact completed upon their becoming aware of those 
matters.’[16]  The crucial factor required for the offence to be made out was that the 
acts have the ‘causal potency’ to satisfy the detriment pursuant to s 
359B(d)(i).[17]  This would indicate that stalking is a continuing offence in the sense 
that it is only complete when the victim is made aware of the acts and that such acts 
have the ‘causal potency’ to cause the stalked person apprehension or fear, 
reasonably arising in all the circumstances, of violence to the stalked person. 
While Applegarth J in Re Taylor and McGill DCJ in Davies both agree that there is at 
least an ‘implicit’ requirement of knowledge of the acts,[18] at some point, there 
would appear to be a number of questions still unanswered.  Of greatest significance 
is the fact that the section is silent on the knowledge aspect of the victim, and it is 
arguable that a higher court could determine that it is not a requirement that the 
victim have any knowledge at all of the acts.   It is certainly arguable that the purpose 
of the criminal law is to prohibit offending behaviour and it should not matter whether 
a person is aware of the behaviour or not since this changes nothing of the offending 
acts. 
A different question that remains relates to which test to apply in determining 
whether the victim ‘would’ have the necessary apprehension of detriment.  Given 
that the section refers to ‘reasonably’ arising, and the ‘stalked person’, the statute 
does appear to contemplate the use of an objective standard.    However, is this an 
objective assessment of an ordinary person in the position of the ’stalked person’, 
thereby taking into consideration the personal attributes of the victim, or is it an 
objective assessment using an ordinary person test, irrespective of the personal 
characteristics of the complainant?  The judgments in Re Taylorand Davies would 
indicate the former is more likely to apply, however in the absence of judicial 
clarification, the matter remains open to debate. 
One way to shed more light on the issue, might be to examine more closely the 
purpose of the anti-stalking legislation, and this will be the topic of future posts. 
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